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r THE RULE OF LAW AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR: 
REFLECTIONS ON NORTHERN IRELAND 
by 
RICHARD DEVLI� 
There has never been a document of culture which was not at the same 
time a document of barbarism. 
Walter Benjamin 
I. Introduction 
In this essay, I employ the methodology of narrative jurispru­
dence1 to develop briefly some critical reflections on the nature and 
function of law in Northern Ireland, and in so doing to give voice to 
what bell hooks has called a "subjugated knowledge".2 In order to 
achieve this goal I will draw upon the interdisciplinary insights of 
neo-marxist, feminist and critical political and social theory, and psy­
choanalysis. In Part II, I will interpret my own experiences of law in 
Northern Ireland through the adumbration of neo-Marxist inspired 
theory of the nature and function of law in a western liberal demo­
cratic society. Particular attention will be paid to the legal dimensions 
of the Hunger Strike of 1981. Part 111 will explain that the juridical 
problems of Northern Ireland cannot be understood as solely a ques­
tion of "terrorism" or the failure of the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law 
is an ideological ideal that obscures the way in which the poJitics of 
fear are imbricated in it. Consequently, there are irrational and un-
,. 
2 
Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School, Halifax, Canada. This is a 
revised version of a paper delivered at the Critical Legal Conference held 
at Queen's University Belfast. 1990. Tammy Donovan. David Dzidzornu. 
Bill Plettle, Shirl Roch and Rose Wood have provided assistance in pro­
ducing this essay. 
For a bibliography of narrative jurisprudence, see D. Elkins. Journal of 
Legal Education 40 (1990), 203. 
Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics (Toronto: Between the Lines. 
1990), 8. 
.. 
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conscious factors, as well as rational, utilitarian and conscious consid­
erations, that help to explain what happens in Northern Ireland. 
Part IV finally argues that an element of the solution to the prob­
lem is the recognition that neurotic fear is a fundamental dynamic of 
the Rule of Law and that until law is disconnected from fear, the spi­
ral will continue. I will suggest that to begin to seek out an alternative 
vantage point on law, we should look to feminism. From this 
perspective, I will suggest that if law was made more a cognate of the 
ethic of care rather than hierarchy, if mutual responsibility and a val­
orization of "otherness" could trump hubris, then some tentative 
steps might be taken to decentre the impulse to Thanatos that under­
lies the Northern Irish legal system. 
II. A Relational Theory of the State and an Interactional Theory of Law 
A. The State 
Both Liberalism and traditional Marxism, despite their apparent 
differences, reify the state. Liberalism, working on the assumption of 
consensus, perceives the state as a subject, a neutral arbitrator and 
great 1eve11er. Traditional Marxism, on the contrary, based on the as­
sumption of conflict, portrays the state as an object, a malleable in­
strument of domination in the hands of the ruling class. Both ap­
proaches mischaracterize the state by portraying it as a "thing". 
Fo11owing Gramsci and Poulantzas, it is explanatorily superior to 
comprehend the state as relational, that is, as the material condensa­
tion of the social relations of society.3 In particular, the state should 
be understood as a factor of social cohesion, as seeking to keep society 
together in spite of the fragmentation and plurality of interests. This 
is not however liberal pluralism, because applications of this theory 
show state power as the power of a definite class or group to whose 
interests the state corresponds. In the context of Northern Ireland, 
these interests have, historically, been those of the Protestant middle 
and upper classes.4 Simultaneously, we must be careful not to slip 
3 Sec my "Law's Centaur", Osgoode Hall Law fournal 28 (1989). 219. 
4 For an impressive and full discussion of this proposition see P. Bew. P. 
Gibson and H. Patterson, The State in Northern Ireland 1921-1972 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1979). 
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into marxist instrumentalism, that is, the idea that the state is simply 
manipulated by the Protestant ruling class to the disadvantage of all 
Catholics.5 A distinction must be drawn between seeing the state as 
operating at the behest of the ruling Protestants (the instrumentalist 
analysis) and on their behalf (the relational analysis). Thus, the con­
cessions granted to working class Protestants and Catholics do not 
undercut the supremacy of the Protestant ruling class. The education 
of Catholics is an important example. Education was never conceived 
of as a palliative for the Catholics, but it did provide a career and class 
structure that allowed upward mobility to certain sections of the 
Catholic community, thereby deradicalizing its leadership. 
The state can achieve the cohesion that is its function either 
through the pursuit of hegemony or through the enforcement of coer­
cion. As Femia6 points out, there are three possible "levels" of hege­
mony: integral, decadent and minimal. Integral hegemony is the para­
digm situation, and is basically unachievable outside "organic socie­
ties." In decadent hegemony the elite is incapable of commanding 
unequivocal allegiance from the non-elite, and the potential for social 
disintegration and conflict is ever present. Minimal hegemony rests 
on the ideological unity of the economic, political and intellectual 
elites and the simultaneous fulfilment of a few of the interests of the 
subordinated groups. The state staggers on by the co-option of the 
leaders of the subordinate classes. 
Minimal hegemony, describes the Northern Irish situation. Vari­
ous carrots are offered by the Protestant elite to the Protestant work­
ing class, like job preference in "the security forces",7 and to the politi-
S See for example, E. Strauss, Irish Nationalism and British Democracy 
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1951). 
6 J. Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon. 1981 ), 46-49. 
7 R. Rowthorn, "Unemployment: The Widening Sectarian Cap", Fortnight 
16 December-26th January 1986. This, of course, is simply the fulfilment 
of well established Protestant elite demands. Consider, for example, 
Brian Faulkner's (Stormont M.P. and subsequent Prime Minister of 
Northern Ireland) pronouncement in 1954 that: 
There is no reason why Orangemen individually and collectively 
should not interest themselves in the economic welfare of the com­
munity. I mean by that statement we should be anxious to find em­
ployment for our brethren. 
Quoted in Sunday Times Insight Team, Ulster (London: Penguin, 1972), 
30. For a full discussion of the systematic nature of the discrimination in 
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cal and intellectual elites of the Catholics - social status and relative 
financial comfort. However, minimal hegemony contains the seeds of 
its own destruction, because it confers some power on the subordi­
nate class which will eventually be used to further destabilize the 
power of the ruling classes. Support of the working class Protestants 
for the Democratic Unionist Party and the demand for civil rights and 
measures against discrimination by educated Catholics and some lib­
eral Protestants8 in the late 1960's are such examples. But when inte­
gral hegemony is unattainable because of the magnitude of the con­
tradictions, cohesion might still be maintained through the second 
path: coercion. 
It is interesting to note that some neo-Marxist9 and critical legal 
scholars, 10 reacting to Marxist instrumentalism, have tended to focus 
their analyses on the hegemonic and ideological aspects of the mod­
ern state, thereby underemphasising its coercive element. We should 
bear in mind, however, that Gramsci, who wrote his notebooks while 
in prison, understood hegemony and coercion as being in a dialectical 
relationship in that, political relations 
have two fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of 
Machiavelli's centaur - half animal, half human. These are the levels of 
force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation.11 
If integral hegemony is unattainable and consequently only deca­
dent and minimal hegemony are left and they, in turn, are inherently 
incapable of achieving the coercion required, then we are left with a 
clearer understanding of the relationship between coercion and the 
liberal democratic state. Coercion and hegemony function simultane­
ously to cement liberal democratic societies together. The modern 
state is not an 'exceptional' fascist state; nor is it 'normal', that is, a 
Northern Ireland see R. Rowthorn and N. Wayne, Northern Ireland: The 
Political Economy of Conflict (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988). 
8 K.A. Kovalcheck, "Catholic Grievances in Northern Ireland: Approaches 
and Judgement", British Journal of Sociology 38 (1987), 77 at 80. 
9 For example, N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: 
New left Books, 1977); and L. Althusser, For Marx (London: Verso, 1969). 
10 See generally, M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge 
Mass.: Havard University Press, 1988). 
11 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International 
Publishers, 1977), 169-170. 
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supposedly non-coercive statc.12 Jt is an authoritarian state in which 
coercion complements hegemony in a dialectical unity. As the politi­
cal anthropologist Allen Feldman points out: 
Since its inception in 1921, the Northern Ireland state never functioned as 
a passive instrument of class or sectarian interest. Rather it engaged in 
autonomous programs of internal hegemonization that generated a re­
ceptive configuration of Protestant class fractions. The state sought legit­
imation in the democratization of violence, which strengthened its affec­
tive association with populist anti-Catholic actions and postures. The 
democratized command. of violence was instituted through the B 
Specials, a paramilitary unit with strong regionalist ties to Protestant 
communities. The state used the paramilitary organisation and the RUC 
to rationalize populist sentiment. This regimented and regimental pop­
ulism enabled the state to actively collaborate in the formation of 
Protestant ethnicity ... 
The state's militarist articulation with local Loyalist culture blurred any 
distinction between repressive and ideological apparatuses. This confla­
tion rendered the social rhetoric of violence and the paramilitary regi­
mentation of the masses internal mechanisms for aligning Protestant 
class fractions. 13 
Law, I will now argue, is the apotheosis of this dialectical unity. 
B. The Law 
I have emphasized the importance of the political analysis of the 
state for two reasons. First, an examination of the nature of the state 
is vital for the understanding of the Rule of Law, which is over-de­
termined by politics. Secondly, the fairly abstract discussion of the 
state is homologous with the more contextual theory of law devel­
oped below. 
We should approach law in the same way as we approached the 
state: that is, we must reject the reification inherent in both libcral14 
12 These arc terms developed by Nicos Poulantzas in his analysis of state 
forms in Fascism and Dictatorship (London: New Left Books, 1976); Crisis 
of the Dictatorships (London: New Left Books, 1976); State, Power and 
Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1979). 
1 3  Allen Feldman. Formations of Violence (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 1991 ), 40. 
14 For a fairly classic statement of the liberal viewpoint sec D.S. Greer, 'The 
Impact of the Troubles on the Law and Legal System of Northern Ire­
land". in A.J. Ward. ed., Northern Ireland: Living with the Crisis (Green-
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and traditional Marxist analyses. Law is neither a thing nor is it 
monolithic; it is part of the complex matrix of society. It too is a ma­
terial condensation of social relations. Moreover, law is not simply a 
passive or reactive component of the social whole. It is a proactive, or 
formative, component of that matrix. Law is constitutive of, as much 
as it is reactive to, social relations. This might be called an interaction­
al theory of law. A useful example of the reactive and constitutive na­
ture of law can be found in the operations of the Constitution of 
Northern Ireland. 
The Constitution and the statelet came about as a result of the re­
treating colonialism of the British Empire, and the pursuit of self-de­
termination by the Irish people. However, not all those who lived in 
Ireland sought self-determination, and some wished to retain the link 
with Britain. The Constitution was a reaction to these political reali­
ties, and an artificial statelet was created as a compromise. However, 
once created, the Constitution had a dramatic impact on the identity 
of those whose interests it was said to represent. Protestants fre­
quently identified themselves as "Ulstermen" [sic)15, sometimes in 
preference to Britain. Thus, when British policies in Northern Ireland, 
such as Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Accord, do not correspond 
with the self-perceived interests of the Protestant majority, many of 
them have indicated that they would forego their relationship with 
Britain in order to maintain the identity of Protestant Ulster. The 
Northern Irish Constitution condensed existing political relations but 
also constituted the identity of the Protestant people showing that 
Constitutions have profound ideological significance. Thus, the in­
teractional theory of law encourages us to recognize that we make our 
own history, and to recognize that law is both a consequence and 
constitutive of social relations. 
This is not, however, a pluralist analysis which portrays law as a 
neutral arena which absorbs and balances all relative viewpoints. The 
relationships involved are much more internal and the people inter­
acting occupy different social positions: some rich, some poor; some 
religious, some non-religious; some British, some Irish. These people 
express their interpretations, their desires, their fears and their visions 
wood: Praeger, 1987), 46 at 69. 
15 For a further discussion of cultural identities in Northern Ireland see R. 
Rose, Governing Without Consensus (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). 485. 
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through the law. Law itself must therefore be studied in terms of 
classes and class factions, political parties and political cliques, bu­
reaucrats, cultural and religious movements and all their correspond­
ing idcologies.16 Law is created by the interaction of all these social 
forces and , in turn, helps create the way in which these social forces 
interact. Law "both constitutes and is constituted".17 
The values inherent in law therefore cannot be viewed as tran­
scendental, rising above factional partisanship. On the contrary, law 
becomes another aspect of social relations where partisanship ex­
presses itself; law is not distinct from politics but integral to politics. 
Thus, apart from de-reifying law and emphasizing its irrepressibly 
contextual nature, the interactional theory has the therapeutic conse­
quence of enabling us to see that law is a human construct and there­
fore contingent, indeterminate, relative and subjective. 
However, the interactional theory of law, underpinned as it is by 
the relational theory of the state, while recognizing the theoretical 
possibility that law has no natural essence, it does not slip into an un­
critical belief in openness. An interactional theory, conscious of the 
dynamics of power and privilege. recognizes that law too, as a sub­
component of the state, is driven by the "imperative of cohesion", the 
structural preservation of the status quo. It gravitates toward the pro­
tection and advancement of the interests of those who dominate in a 
society; it subordinates those who refuse to comply. As Mike 
Tomlinson says of pre-1969 Northern Ireland, "(a)s institutionalized 
forms, the police and the legal system constituted the most powerful 
expression of Unionist authority."18 
This, however, is not simply a revamped version of instrumental­
ist Marxism; it is not law as a malleable tool in the hands of the ruling 
class. The relationship of law and politics is best understood as 
"relatively autonomous". The political docs not determine the legal. 
Each of the fields develops out of the interaction, conflict and mutual 
adaptation of a variety of classes, social groups and subgroups on a 
16 Aspects of such an analysis can be discovered in the work of Bew et al. 
see supra n.4. and British State and the Ulster Crisis (London: Verso, 1985). 
17 Alan Hunt, "The Theory of Critical Legal Studies", Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies S (1985), 37, 38. 
18 M. Tomlinson. "Reforming Repression", in L. O 'Dowd, 8. Rolston and M. 
Tomlinson. eds., Northern Ireland: Between Civil Rights and Civil War 
(London: Pluto, 1980). 178 at 1 79. 
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sition of the legal profession contrast sharply with the characteristics of 
most of the defendants. The majority are working class Catholics, often 
unemployed and dependent on state benefits.21 
However, as the example of the Diplock court system indicates. 
the judiciary ultimately complies with the broader political necessity 
for the "reorganization of the judicial system into a counter-insur­
gency apparatus".22 Legal autonomy is only relative. Legal personnel 
incorporate their own "political til ts" into their legal roles. In this 
way, legal relations are influenced by the competing political aspira­
tions of various social groups. However, it is not surprising to find 
that, generally, political and legal aspects are in harmony, indeed. 
perhaps in "teeth gritting" harmony. The explanation is not difficult 
to find: often the people with the greatest influence in both these are­
nas arc from similar backgrounds and share a common ideology. 
Particularly poignant is Paddy Hillyard 's analysis of the political 
connections of the Northern Ireland judiciary: 
One of the major complaints of the civil rights movement was the parti­
san character of the Northern Ireland judiciary and the police. Of the 20 
High Court judges appointed since the independent Northern Ireland 
courts were established, 15 had been openly associated with the Unionist 
Party; of the 23 County Court appointments, 14 had been visibly con­
nected with Unionism. By the late 1960's, all the more important eche­
lons of the judiciary and magistracy had strong Unionist associations. In 
the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. two out of the three judges were 
ex-Attorney Generals in Unionist governments. In the High Court. one 
of the four judges was another ex-Attorney General and one was the son 
of an Attorney General. Among the twelve Resident Magistrates there 
was an ex-Unionist MP. an ex-Unionist Senator, a defeated Unionist 
candidate and a former legal adviser to the Ministry of Home Affairs ... 
Since 1969 a few Catholics have been appointed to the judiciary and the 
magistracy. Four of the ten judges in the High Court are now Catholic. 
although only one out of twelve is Catholic in the County Courts. Both 
professions therefore remain firmly rooted in Unionism . . .  23 
21 P. Hillyard. "The Political and Social Dimensions of Emergency Law in  
Northern Ireland", in Jennings. supra n.19, at 191. 202. 
22 Allen Feldman, supra n.13, at 87. See also B. Dickson. "The Legal 
Response to the Troubles in Northern Ireland", in P.J. Roche and B. 
Barton. eds .• The Northern Ireland Question: Myth and Reality (Aldershot: 
Avesbury. 1991). 151 at 159. 
23 Supra n.21, at 200. Such statistics may help to shed light on the concern 
identified by Professor D.  Creer supra n.14. at 51 that "(t)he failure of 
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In Northern Ireland the connections between the juridical and po­
litical systems are very close. Let me now tum to the various ways in 
which the law fulfils its cohesive functions. I will argue that the law 
fulfils ideological ,  facilitative and violent functions. I will then pro­
ceed to posit the relationship between these functions. 
1 .  The Ideological Role of Law 
Law, in its ideological role, contributes to the state's attempt to 
achieve hegemony. Law attempts to affect people's  lives in such a 
way that they consent to the current state of affairs.24 Law fulfils 
what may be called a "directive" function in that its purpose is to 
achieve an acceptable level of consensus, to create relative stability in 
order that existing social relations might continue. The ideological 
function of law is to generate "spontaneous consent" and "the will to 
conform",25 those two attitudes which indicate that some class or 
group has attained hegemony. Gramsci explicitly recognized this role 
in one of his few passing references to law: 
This problem contains in a nutshell the entire "juridical" problem. that is. 
the problem of assimilating the entire grouping onto its most advanced 
fraction; it is the problem of education of the masses. and their 
"adaption" in accordance with the goal to be achieved. This is precisely 
the function of the law and state and in society ... 26 
Modem law plays a norm creating role which justifies modern social 
relations. It fulfils this role by the dual movement of "mystification" 
and "legitimation". 
a. Mystification 
Ideologies are material practices in that, not only are they created, 
Roman Catholics to seek legal remedies in the courts for alleged discrim­
ination ... in housing or employment has been regarded by some 
[identities unspecified I as the most puzzling feature of the Northern 
Ireland law and legal system prior to 1969." 
24 Elsewhere, supra n.3. I have indicated that the concept of ideology as false 
consciousness should be rejected in favour of ideology as lived relations. 
25 Gramsci. supra n.11, at 195. 
26 Ibid. 
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but they also create social relations. A useful example is the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act in Great Britain which the government 
uses to generate anti-Irish hysteria in England, and to normalize an 
interventionist state that allows 45,000 people each year to be 
stopped, examined, searched and questioned,27 all in the name of 
keeping out the "terrorists". Many people accept this as legitimate, 
even though it is part of the larger pattern of increased repression in 
England. Another example has been the attempt to construct as crim­
inal, the activities of those who resist British rule. In this way, the 
question of national identity is reinterpreted as a problem of law and 
order. A central component of this depoliticizing process was the ju­
dicialization of internment. These are not simply abstract ideas; for 
the law cultivates a framework of suppositions upon which people 
build their relationships and activities, achieving what Poulantzas de­
scribes as a "remarkable socialization". Indeed, i t  was not until the 
Hunger Strikes of 1981 that the majority of the nationalist population 
fully realized the ideological significance of Gardiner' s criminaliza­
tion project. Moxon-Browne's study reveals that prior to the hunger 
strike, sixty-six percent of Catholics (and ninety two percent of 
Protestants) concurred with the statement that "the IRA are basically 
a bunch of criminals and murderers."28 
b. Legitimation 
Legitimation provides the second aspect of legal ideology's dual 
movement. Poulantzas describes this as a "unifying effect" in which 
the state is presented as sovereign. A classic example is the Northern 
Ireland statelet itself, a politico-ideological artifact, which brought to­
gether the diverse interests of different classes of Protestants. It is ju­
ridical ideology which effects this dual movement; the juridical repre­
sentation of the state as a source of unity in the midst of alienation, an 
alienation for which it is itself responsible. Moreover, law 's own role 
in such a society is reinforced because, 
the state's unity is found ... in the modern juridical system: the specific 
27 C. Scorer et al, The New Prevention of Terrorism Ad (London: The Cobden 
Trust. 1985), 36. 
28 E. Moxon Browne, "The Water and the Fish: Public Opinion and the 
Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland", in P. Wilkinson. ed .• British Perspec­
tives on Terrorism (London: Hutchinson. 1981 ). 41. 
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normative ensemble made up of legal subjects modelled according to the 
image of the citizen, presents a systematic unity of the highest degree. in 
that it regulates the unity of these subjects by means of laws.29 
Law aspires to be the medium of cohesion amongst antagonistic social 
relations, an example f rom the Northern Irish context being the "anti­
discrimination strategies" of the late 1 960's and 1970's30, but this is an 
antagonism for which it is at least partially responsib le. Law is eulo­
gized as the great civilizing force in society, the great protector: 
over the past ten years much has been done to ensure that human rights 
in NI should be as well protected as elsewhere in the UK - indeed there 
are those who have said that there are more measures to maintain fair 
treatment and give legal protection to human rights in NI than in most 
other parts of Europe.31 
Law is counterpoised to barbarism, violence and terrorism. Thus the 
world is turned ups ide down. Law is presented as the creator of soci­
ety, when the reverse is more accurate; it is people who create law to 
regulate, or more accurately enforce, their own vis ion of social rela­
tions. Indeed, the dominance of juridico-political ideology is so per­
vasive that even during per iods of crisis, oppressed groups often chal­
lenge authority within the paramete rs permitted by law . Civil d is­
obed ients appeal to concepts such as justice, rights, the Rule of Law 
and operate within the conf ines of legitimacy outlined by those who 
effectively dominate social relations. In doing so, they may gain some 
victories, even real victories, but the rules arc tilted in such a way that 
they can never threaten the essentials of contemporary social re la­
tions. If the rules do provide a threat, then they will be changed. I n  
short, such is law's capacity to act as social cement and contro l  social 
discourse, that most people l ive their revolt within the bounds of juri­
d ico-polit ical ideology. 
I nterestingly, the concept of civil disobedience has been under­
nurtured by the state in Northern Ireland and the law has been unable 
to adequately "b reed values" so as to render the nat ionalist 
community malleable. Th is fa ilure is due, in part, to the historical 
over-reliance on d iscrim inatory municipal laws and emergency pow­
ers. 
29 Poulantzas, supra n.9, at 278. 
30 See, for example, Dickson, supra n.22. at 152-157. 
31 Protecting l luman Rights in Northern Ireland (1979), a British government 
publication, as quoted by Tomlinson, supra n.18, at 194. 
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The EPA is custom built for the oppression of a people. It's the model 
legislation for any country that wants to oppress people. The whole con­
veyor belt system is corrupt. The whole legal system here is geared to 
politics, not justice. They should stop using the Jaw as a counterinsur­
gency tool. The EPA isn't a justice system - there's no justice for 
Catholics here. Here. the law is a tool to keep Catholics under control 
and in their place ... 32 
Thus, the violent aspects of law are intertwined with ideology and 
legitimacy. Indeed this ideological trope becomes particularly per­
suasive, when it appears that so many of the "criminals" actually 
"confess" to their crimes.33 Downplayed are the torturous, inhuman 
and degrading circumstances in which such confessions are ob­
tained.34 
To conclude, it is clear that law as ideology is a crucial method by 
which the hegemonic condition is sought. However, it is important to 
avoid over-emphasizing the role of ideology; it is only one of several 
functions which modem law fulfils. Ideology is mediated by the 
other (facilitative and violent) functions of law and the law must al­
ways, first and foremost, be oriented toward the maintenance of social 
order. 
2. The Facili tative Role of Law 
A second manner in which law contributes to the continuation of 
capitalist social relations can be characterized as facilitative and re­
lates more directly to the economic side of human interactions. In 
brief, the facilitative role of law, like the ideological role, is oriented 
towards the attainment of a hegemonic condition. It can be character­
ized as "lal  set of rules which organizes capitalist exchange and pro­
vides a real framework of cohesion in which commercial encounters 
can take place."35 Law in this sense fulfils the role which Gramsci de-
32 J. Sluka. Hearts and Minds, Fish and Water: Support for the IRA and The 
lNLA in a Northern Irish Ghetto (London: Jai Press, 1989). 206. 
33 Occasionally. this results in double-doublespeak. as for example when 
using the concept of "converted terrorist", immunity or a reduction of 
sentence is granted. 
34 Sec generally D. Walsh, The Use and Abuse of Emergency Legislation in 
Northern Ireland (London: The Cobden Trust, 1983). 
35 Poulantzas. supra n.9, at 53. 
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scribes as that of an "organizer", it keeps things moving. Its relevance 
to this paper may be exemplified in the law of contract -with its 
ideological assumption of freedom to contract -that aIJows for dis­
criminatory hiring practices36 and underpins a resistance to anti-dis­
crimination legislation. An historical example is the fact that limited 
companies in Northern Ireland -which were predominantly owned 
by Unionists -"were entitled to nominate up to six extra voters."37 
3. The Violent Role of l.Jiw 
Frequently, this function of law is encoded as the "repressive" or 
"coercive" aspect of law. However, in order to confront the conven­
tional wisdom that law and violence are antithetical, I want to make 
the strong claim that violence is an imperative of legal activity within 
contemporary society. We must acknowledge, first, that violence can 
be used both by those who defend existing social relations, and those 
who challenge them. Second, it is important to make clear that when 
legal personnel use violence, often it is not merely individual excess38, 
the "frenzied attack"39 carried out in the heat of the moment. Violence 
is endemic to the legal relations of modem society. 
Existing society seeks to preserve itself in its established, known 
form; those groups who benefit from a particular configuration of so­
cial relations strive to preserve that situation. The State, as a material 
condensation of social relations, also functions to preserve the status 
quo. But the contradictions are too great, and since modem society is 
in continual flux, forces desiring social change continually emerge. 
When radical demands become threatening to the status quo, "accom­
modation" is replaced by coercion. Law is a vital part of these social 
36 The Fair Employment Agency. "Report of an Investigation into Queen's 
University at Belfast" Table 4. at 11. 
37 Sunday Times Insight Team. supra n.7. at 35. 
38 The Cameron Report on Disturbances in Northern Ireland (1969 Cmnd. 532) 
describes and trivializes the activities of the "security forces" as follows: 
"a number of policeman were guilty of misconduct which involved as­
sault and battery, malicious damage to property ... and the use of 
provocative sectarian political slogans", at 73. 
39 Home office pathologist. Alan Watson. describing the apparent mode of 
execution of Scan Savage in Gibraltar on 6th September 1988. Cited in 
Jennings, supra n.19. at xvi. 
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relations. There may be a widespread respect for the Rule of Law, but 
at the same time there is often dissent which manifests itself as a 
challenge to social stability. Though not necessarily oriented towards· 
a revolutionary change in social relations, dissent does pose a threat 
to the social order. Law plays a crucial role in terminating this threat. 
As Colin Summer reminds us, "I tlhe legal system is first and foremost 
a means of exercising political control."40 Moreover, this "imperative 
for the preservation of stability", as it might be ca11ed, is not a novel 
role which "authoritarian statist law" has taken on as, Poulantzas for 
example, might suggest. It is an endemic feature of modem law.41 
Should there be any doubt as to the falsity of the counter-positing of 
law and violence, and the existential reality of the pervasiveness of 
legal violence in society, one needs only to consider the extensiveness 
of the armoury of legal violence: executive, legislative, judicial, police, 
military and penal. They could fi11 volumes.42 The ideological trope 
that is worked here is that it is called law. As Benjamin, with charac­
teristic conciseness, avers, "Law making is power-making, and to that 
extent, an immediate manifestation of violence."4..1 
4. The Genius of l.Jlw 
Law is driven by the couplet of "consent and coercion" or "kicks 
and kindness". But this does not imply that the greater the violence, 
the less the consent. The zero-sum approach, in which as one in­
creases, the other necessarily decreases fails to capture the genius of 
law. Law's genius lies in its ability to make two acts, which are essen­
tially the same, ideologica11y different. Law makes legal violence le­
gitimate, and illegal violence illegitimate. Legal violence becomes ac­
ceptable in the popular psyche, even when used against those whose 
dissent is peaceful. Because there must be dissent within liberal 
democratic society there must always be a need for social control. 
Ideology is inherently incapable of transcending the factors of dise-
40 Reading Ideologies (New York: Academic Press. 1977), 277. 
41 "Law's Centaur", supra n.3. at 272-281. 
42 Two recent discussions of the Irish question would indicate this. See 
Jennings. supra n.19. and G. Hogan and C. Walker, Political Violence and 
the Law in Ireland (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989). 
43 W. Benjamin, "Critique of Violence", in Reflections (New York: Harcourt. 
Brace. Jovanovitch, 1978), 277 at 295. 
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quilibrium; instability will surface, and "when in doubt" those who 
have been threatened by social instability will "lash out".44 Law has a 
very human face with very human instincts. Law is people in action, 
but more importantly, it is legal people in action. In this way their 
actions appear to be legitimate. The genius of law stems from its ca­
pacity for legal and legitimate violence. Legal violence and legal ide­
ology co-exist in a permanent mutually reinforcing unity. Law is a 
constitutionalization of violence. 
Violence is continually present in the law, whether i t  is used fre­
quently or infrequently. Violence in the law is not just oriented to­
wards potential rebels or malcontents; it is directed towards all of us. 
Legal violence stalks in the guise of criminal law, the law against 
"normal crime". Once we recognize this metamorphosis, the integral 
relationship between violence and ideology becomes manifest. 
Because of the power of the threat of legal violence one is continually 
made conscious, through the police on the beat, through the media, 
through the courts, and finally through personal experience, of the ef­
fectiveness of legal violence. The act and threat-45 of violence has a 
double effect: first, i t  removes, either temporarily (for example, 
through internment by remand46) or permanently (for example, by 
means of a shoot to kill policy47), certain individuals; second, and 
more importantly, it modifies the conduct of other people. In brief, 
law, through legal violence, effectively used and even more effec­
tively publicized, terrorizes us into acquiescence. 
44 This was very much the response of the Stormont government in the first 
couple of years of the current phase of nationalist discontent when it 
added the Firearms Act (N.I.) 1969, The Protection of the Person and 
Property Act (NI) 1969, The Criminal Justice Temporary Provisions Act 
(N.I.) 1970, The Firearms Amendment Act (1971) and the Public Order 
(Amendment) Acts 1970, 1971 to the already comprehensive and draco­
nian Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, first enacted in 1922. and 
made permanent in 1933. More recent examples under the British admin­
istration might include the original Prevention of Terrorism Act which 
was passed very quickly after the infamous Birmingham Bombs, and the 
radical diminution of the right to silence in the Criminal Evidence (N.I.) 
Order 1988. after a series of bombings in the summer of that year. 
45 R.J. Spjut, "The Official Use of Deadly Force", Public I.Aw (1986), 38. 
46 S. Creer, "Internment with a Judges Stamp", Fortnight No. 203, 1984. 
47 See, John Stalker, Stalker (London: Penguin. 1988), K . Asma! (Chair­
person) Shoot to Kill ? International Lawyers Inquiry (1985) . 
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In the context of Northern Ireland, there is perhaps no clearer ex­
ample of this interplay of ideology, violence and criminality than the 
Hunger Strike of 1981 .  Prior to the Gardiner ReJX)rt which introduced 
the process of 'criminalisation' in 1975, those who were detained 
without trial were considered to have "special category status". The 
mode of arrest, interrogation, and imprisonment were an implicit ac­
knowledgement of their political status and therefore a candid, if re­
luctant. admission that law was being used as a mode of repression. 
In an attempt to gamer world favour48 and to undermine supJX)rt in 
nationalist communities for Republicans, it was decided that it would 
be better to characterize those who resisted the authority of the British 
state as "terrorists" and "criminals" rather than JX)litical prisoners: 
Each and every prisoner has been tried under the judicial system estab­
lished in Northern Ireland by Parliament. Those found guilty, after the 
due process of law. if they are sent to prison by the courts. serve their 
sentence for what they are - convicted criminals. 
They are not political prisoners: more than 80 have been convicted of 
murder or attempted murder and more than 80 of explosive offences. 
They are members of organizations responsible for the deaths of hun­
dreds of innocent people, the maiming of thousands more and the tor­
ture, by knee-capping, of more than 600 of their own people . . .  No one 
who is convicted of a crime carried out after 1 March 1976 - and that in­
cludes those involved in the 'dirty ' protest - will be given any form of 
special status.49 
As a result, the Long Kesh concentration camp was rebuilt in H­
Block formations, and rechristened Her Majesty's Prison, The Maze; 
those processed through the Diplock court system were encoded as 
"criminals" rather than "special category status" political prisoners. 
When incarcerated, they were treated as "convicts", that is, they had 
to wear uniforms, engage in prison work, and surrender the right of 
free association. The aim, in sum, was to reconstitute the problem of 
Northern Ireland as merely one of law and order. The prisoners re­
fused to wear what they themselves called "the badge of criminality" 
(uniforms). Through the late 1970's, they went on the blanket protest, 
followed by the dirty protest and eventually, under the leadership of 
48 Sec. for example, W.R. Van Straubanzee, "International Law and Interna­
tional Terrorism", in J. Shaw et al., Ten Years of Terrorism (New York: 
Crane Russak, 1979). 153 at 157. 
49 Statement from the Northern Ireland Office. August 1978. 
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Bobby Sands, the hunger strike. 
The hunger strike is, in many ways, the apotheosis of the nexus 
between the ideology of law and the violence of law. At stake was the 
desire of the British government to finally crush all Republican de­
mands to legitimacy by socially constructing them as criminals, even 
though they had been subject to specialized legal processes. As the 
government argued in a release entitled Protecting Human Rights in 
Northern Ireland (1 979): 
All NI courts and the NI judiciary are completely independent of 
Government control . . .  and they are an integral part of the legal system in 
the UK. The courts play a fundamental role in the protection of human 
rights in NI ... No-one is imprisoned for his political beliefs, and there are 
no political prisoners in Nl.50 
For the republican prisoners, Long Kesh/The Maze was the epit­
ome of the violence of the British state: a metaphor for Anglo-Irish 
relations. The hunger strikers, in support of their "five demands" for 
special category status, reconstituted their bodies as a terrain of politi­
cal struggle. Resistance was an attempt to re-assert agency and to 
seek out the lacuna in what, otherwise, would appear to be an almost 
total system of endocolonial repression: surveillance, arrest, interro­
gation. prosecution, conviction and incarceration. As Allen Feldman 
posits in his superb study, "in Northern Ireland, the practice of politi­
cal violence entails the production, exchange and ideological con­
sumption of bodies."51 The re-encoding of the body not as a criminal 
but as a terrain of struggle in the pursuit of freedom was considered 
to be the ultimate transgression of the cordon sanitaire of the H. Blocks. 
But although the hunger strike and the war of positions it engen­
dered were profoundly political ,  at another level, they were deeply 
legal. Hunger striking was not a recent phenomenon in Ireland. On 
the contrary, its roots can be traced back to an ancient, Pre-Christian 
Irish legal code, the Brehon Laws, and the practice of cealachan or 
troscead. Cealachan/troscead is a component of the ancient Irish Law of 
Athgabhail (Distress) which, in common law terms, could be consid­
ered a remedy for the commission of a tort.52 Stated simply, if a per-
SO Cited in Tomlinson, supra n.18, at 194. 
51 Feldman, supra n.13, at 9. 
52 Sec generally. L. Ginnell, The Brehon Laws (London: T.F. Unwin, 1894). 
161-164; Sophie Bryant, Liberty, Order and Law under Native Irish Rule 
(New York: Encyclopedia Press, 1923), 259-287. 
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son had been wronged by another who was more powerful, the 
wronged party was entitled to claim distress by fasting at the door of 
the wrongdoer, once all other remedies had been exhausted. Respon­
sibility for ending the fast vested in the perceived wrongdoer. If the 
latter allowed the plaintiff to starve to death, then the wrongdoer was 
held responsible for the death and had to compensate the victim's 
family. In 1981 the strikers rediscovered and reconstituted this al­
most silenced countervailing legal regime. The hunger strike, then, 
was not simply a last ditch desperate propaganda stunt. Rather it 
was the espousal of cultural difference, the exposition of a jural other 
and the assertion of a legal right. 
After ten deaths inside the H-Blocks, extensive rioting and many 
deaths outside, the strike was effectively broken by the mothers of a 
later batch of hunger strikers. But it is crucial to note that the British 
government objected not so much to the practices of the prisoners 
within the prison but to their ideological status. For not only had the 
government been covertly negotiating with the Republican leadership 
throughout the strike via an intermediary called "Mountain Climb­
er"53, but also, as soon as the strike was over, most of the five de­
mands were granted.54 The Rule of Law had prevailed, the identity of 
the prisoners as "criminals" had been constituted, and the violence of 
the state had been legitimated. Now that the juridical ritual had been 
consummated by death, certain "privileges" could be granted. The 
double standard is made obvious by the fact that several years later 
the British Government after losing a case on the Prevention of Ter­
rorism Act before the European Court of Human Rights55 derogated 
from the European Convention on Human Rights, on the basis of Art­
icle 1 5, accepting the existence of "a war or public emergency threat­
ening the life of the nation." 
My more general point, then, is that like Christ, the violence of 
53 See, for example, D. Beresford, Ten Men Dead (New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1989), 249-251. 
54 Ibid at 332. 
55 Brogan and Others v. U.K. ( 19891 1 1  E.H.R.R. 1 17. 
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law is always with us.56 At best, it is "permanent exceptionalism."57 
Violence and threats of violence are perceived as legitimate because 
the ideological function of law is operating simultaneously. "Repres­
sion never comes unpackaged".58 Legal violence is perceived as the 
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism, necessary for the preser­
vation of "our shared experience of democracy", essential i f  we are to 
preserve law and order, particularly the latter! The zero-sum, hyd­
raulic piston image does not adequately catch this reality; the tem­
poral approach cannot be sufficient as a critical theory because it fails 
to understand adequately the relation between the ideological and vi­
olent aspects of law. From the point of view of the victims of legal 
violence, any theoretical distinction between the authoritarian and the 
normal state is irrelevant; from the bottom, violence is violence. As 
Jeff Sluka in his anthropological study of opinions in a Catholic ghetto 
points out, there is a widely accepted aphorism: "when those who 
make the law break the law, in the name of the law, then there is no 
law. •'59 
Legal violence, with its aura of legitimacy, is therefore continually 
present; it is a foundation upon which social relations are maintained 
in a society like Northern Ireland. As Poulantzas suggests, 
State monopolized physical violence permanently underlies the tech­
niques of power and mechanisms of consent; it is inscribed in the web of 
disciplinary and ideological devices; and even when not directly exer-
56 Consider, for example, the centuries of precedents for contemporary re­
pressive laws. Sec Hadden et al.. supra n.19. at 13-18; Hogan and Walker, 
supra n.42; Greer. supra n.14, at 54. Note also the parallels between the 
shoot to kill policy and the activities of the Black and Tans. 
57 Consider. in the light of this proposition, the fact that although the Nor­
thern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act was introduced in 1975 as a tem­
porary measure it has stayed in place with routinized renewal debates for 
17 years. and well over 10,000 people have been convicted under it. Also. 
consider the doublespeak of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1974. which has been in force ever since, and which has 
even embarrassed the Jellicoe Inquiry into admitting that "(tlhe inclusion 
of 'Temporary Provisions ' in the title of the PTA rings increasingly 
hollow as the years go by and the act remains in force." Review of the 
Operation of the Prevent of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976. 
(Cmnd. 8803, 1983). 
58 R. Miller and B. Fine, eds .. Policing the Miner's Strike (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart. 1984). 10. 
59 J. Sluka, supra n.32 at 205. 
The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear 175 
ciscd. it shapes the materiality of the social body upon which domination 
is brought to bear. 60 
Ideology may be the dominant role of law, and must therefore merit 
great attention, but this ought not to obscure the fact that violence is 
essential to maintain society and to control those who challenge the 
social order. Through "a ritualized re-synthesis of ideological and re­
pressive apparatuses"61 law is that moment. that specific set of social 
relations which has as its distinctive feature the capacity for supreme 
yet legitimate overt violence. 
IIJ. Fear 
The people who make and enforce legal rules are themselves so­
cial beings. Theirs is a view from the· top. They see their society 
threatened by disruptive elements: the poor, the lazy, the spongers,62 
Fenians.63 They perceive a cloud of chaos shadowing their lives. 
Their motivations do not arise solely out of a bad faith, or conscious 
bias, but rather out of fear. It is not a great conspiracy that leads them 
to resort to legal violence; rather, it is people living their lives in ac­
cordance with their ideology, their sense of reality, who see their 
world menaced. They will fight to preserve that world, that reality. 
In Northern Ireland examples of the fear of the other as articu­
lated through law are legion. Constitutionally, the very construction 
of the state itself - the legal consolidation of the boundary as be­
tween the six counties and the twenty six - was driven by the fear of 
being overwhelmed by Catholic hordes. Legislatively, local electoral 
areas were gerrymandered.64 Nor are the judiciary immune from 
such phobias. Consider, for example, McGonigal L.J. 's dicta in R. v. 
60 State, Power and Socialism. supra n.12. at 81. 
61 Feldman, supra n.13, at 235. 
62 Walsh supra n.34, at 59-60, estimates, for example. that 40% of the offen­
ces tried in Diplock courts in 1 981 were unrelated to terrorist activities. 
63 At the populist level. these fears manifested themselves in pogroms. As 
one government report acknowledges, "eighty three percent of the 3,570 
families that were burned or intimidated out of their homes in the sum­
mer of 1969 were Catholics": "Displacement of Persons" in Violence and 
Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969 (London: HMSO. 1972). 246. 
64 P. Buckland. The Factory of Grievances (New York: Gill and Macmillan. 
1979). 
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McCormick65 that the use of a moderate degree of physical ill-treat­
ment to obtain a confession would not render the statement automati­
cally inadmissible, or Lord Diplock's exoneration of a soldier who 
had killed an unarmed fleeing suspect on the basis of the danger that 
"if he got away, [he] was likely sooner or later to participate in acts of 
violence".66 
By suggesting that the politics of fear is an important element of 
modern law, and positing the possibility of a "juridical uncon­
scious"67, a number of new questions arise. In particular, it is sug­
gested that traditional liberal or marxist analyses of law in so far as 
they focus on the rationalism or utilitarianism of the legal system are, 
perhaps, confronting the most superficial aspects of law. To under­
stand the fear that motivates so much of legal praxis, we must go be­
yond conspiratorial or rationalistic analyses68 to uncover the deep 
motivational, usuaJly unconscious, structures that underpin the legal 
system. Moreover, although this can be attempted through individ­
ual analyses of particular groups, for example the police or judiciary, 
the problems are much more systemic: it may be that the legal order is  
foundationaJly neurotic, and that the quest for rationalistic explana­
tions is, in part, misguided. 
The hunger strike, in particular, demonstrates the poverty of ra­
tionalistic analyses. As pointed out, a key purpose of the criminaliza­
tion of "special category status" prisoners and the redefinition of the 
political nature of the problem as simply jural,  was to undermine the 
legitimacy of Republicanism. However, as a matter of strategy, the 
attempt at criminalisation failed .  Although many governments 
around the world supported Thatcher's intransigence, the media and 
the people in many countries were very sympathetic to the hunger 
strikers, and as a result the LR.A. won an international propaganda 
65 (1977) N.I. 105. 
66 The Attorney General for Northern Treland's Reference (No. 1 of 1975) (19771 
A.C. 105 at 135 (emphasis added). 
67 This idea is derived, to some extent, from Fredric Jameson's The Political 
Unconsdous (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981). 
68 Hadden, Boyle and Campbell seem to buy into such rationalistic analysis 
when they proclaim ·'The natural reaction of governments throughout the 
world when faced with disorders and insurrection is to introduce a bat­
tery of emergency powers", supra n.19, at 17 (emphasis added). There is a 
suggestion of utilitarianism here. 
, 
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victory.69 On the home front, the attempt at  criminalization, rather 
than alienating the nationalist community from the Republicans, 
drove them into further support. During the strike, 30,000 Catholics 
in Fermanagh (South Tyrone) elected Sands to the British Parliament, 
thereby completely undermining the oft stated governmental claim 
that the Republicans were a tiny group of thugs who lacked any sup­
port. Moreover, the attempt after Sands' death to prevent prisoners 
from standing for election through the Representation of the People Act 
1981 made things worse. Sands election agent, Owen Carron, polled 
even more votes. As the American commentator, Padraig O'Malley, 
(hardly a supporter of Republicanism) wrote 
in the end, the British government's obsession with not appearing to be 
beaten consumed its more clever intentions. It won the contest of wills 
but little else. It lost the propaganda war, resuscitated an ailing IRA. and 
politicized militant Republicanism. 70 
Moreover, if adherence to rational law was the issue, the hunger stri­
kers had a good case for they were convicted by special courts, under 
emergency legislation that itself recognized the political nature of 
their offences. Finally, should there be any doubt as to the inade­
quacy of the rationalistic approach, how is one to explain Thatcher's 
comment to Cardinal O'Fiaich: 
Will someone please tell me why they are on hunger strike. I have asked 
so many people. Is it to prove their virility?71 
This tum to what might be called psychoanalytic jurisprudence is, 
in part, influenced by both feminist analyses of law and the work of 
J.C. Smith.n Smith argues that rationalist legal and political theory 
are second-order "myths" that obscure and justify the collective un­
conscious drives that underpin society. Drawing on theories of indi­
vidual development, the tension between the rationalistic ego and the 
irrational id, and in particular the process of separation of self and 
other, Smith argues that the dominant understandings of law are de­
signed to repress these primordial fears. Moreover, he argues that the 
69 Sec P. O'Malley, Biting at the Grave (Boston: Beacon, 1990), 3-4. 
70 Ibid., at 208. 
71 In Beresford, supra n.53, at 212. 
72 "Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence and Limitations of Traditional Legal 
Theory", in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 1990), 223. 
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social order in general, of which he considers law a pre-eminent com­
ponent, is in fact the product of neurosis. This he calls "Oedipus 
Lex".73 
Smith's main example, is male domination in patriarchy. Men 
traumatized by the separation of self from other, unconsciously fear 
the other Im/other, females], and repress this awareness. But in spite 
of this repression, indeed because of it, fear still continues to drive 
them. Law and legal philosophy are complicitous in this process in so 
far as they codify, or obfuscate, the pathological impulse that under­
pins law. However, the fear remains, subterranean but constitutive of 
the pathological legal structure. Smith argues that, by extension, 
these same psychological factors of fear, repression, anxiety and 
pathology produce social structures - law being one - which "per­
mit or facilitate the domination of some males over other rmalcsl". In 
the North American context, he refers to the racial subordination of 
Blacks and Natives, and the fear of the "other" that the legal regime 
reflects and perpetuates through its actions and institutions. 
Viewed in this light, jurisprudence, and indeed the idea of the 
Rule of Law, fulfil "mythic justificatory function(s)". In so far as lib­
eral legalism maintains its pretence to objectivity, abstraction and 
neutrality, captured in such aphorisms as "the Rule of Law, not men" 
it is repressing the neurosis, fear, anxiety and pathology that drive 
man-made law, and its proclivity for the subordination, exclusion and 
silencing of others - be they women, people of colour, or, as in this 
paper, Irish Nationalists. For Smith, we will only be able to make 
progress on such issues if we therapeutically recognize that law, and 
its neurotic underpinnings, arc in fact part of the problem. 
Psychoanalytic theory might shed some light on the Irish con­
text.74 The Northern Ireland educational system reinforces, pcrpetu-
73 Ibid .• at 225. 
74 Let me offer an autobiographical anecdote that. to me at least. suggests 
the plausibility of at least some aspects of the psychoanalytic approach. 
The first time that I remember actually meeting or talking to a Protestant 
person was when I was in my mid-teens. Prior to that. I had lived in or 
on the edges of Catholic ghettos, and my only interaction with 
Protestants was in an adversarial context. One incident that remains par­
ticularly vivid is when I was playing street soccer with some friends 
when up the entry came a crowd of bare-chested. tartan clad. skin head 
"prods", bricks and bottles flying. As I turned around, a lad who must 
have been about eighteen was probably less than ten feet away. Christ 
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ates and escalates the separation between "self" and "other", "us" and 
"them". University is the first time many Northern Irish people expe­
rience an integrated education, and by then it is too late. Though there 
was quite a lot of socialization at  University, divisive patterns pre­
vailed. In the Law Library at Queen's  University Belfast, for example, 
commingling was partial ,  and one half of the library tended to be 
more Catholic, whereas the other tended to be more Protestant. 
Moreover, I suspect that our conversations were fil tered through a 
"hermeneutics of suspicion".75 
The point here is to suggest that given the cultural construction of 
my context, my comprehension of the relationship between self and 
other was one of alienation and hierarchy, predatorial and inegalitar­
ian. However, on entering law school, and being highly educated and 
inculcated in the norms of rationalism,. I sought to repress these 
"tribal" concerns. But repression is not transcendence. The commu­
nal separation of self and other, the fctishization of sameness and the 
fear of di fference pervaded much of my peer group, both Catholics 
and Protestants alike. Indeed, what surprises me is that, given the 
politico-historical conjuncture in which we found ourselves in the 
early 1 980' s, the tensions were not greater. Perhaps as legal acolytes 
we had already so bought into the ideology of the Rule of Law that 
we could not believe the structural reality of what was happening. 
After alJ, we had an emotional and career investment in surviving law 
school. 
Moreover, it seems to me that at this point the student population 
in terms of cultural background may have been roughly equal. 
However, I suspect that as one goes back over the years it will become 
obvious that the pattern is one of increasing Catholic representation. 
As Hillyard points out, "in 1 969, there were 61 barristers, very few of 
whom were Catholic. By 1984, there were over 200 barristers, a signif­
icant but unknown proportion of whom are Catholics."76 And this 
would be clearly reflected both among the practising lawyers and the 
bench, who because of their seniority, will tend to be from the 
d id I run! But for a long time that was my orototypical Protestant: the 
other. 
75 Paul Ricccur. Freud and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1970), 32-36. 
76 Supra n.25, at 202. 
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Protestant culture. Consequently, these upper eche1ons wil1 have 
even Jess exposure to the "other" than many of my peer group had. 
The neurosis may thus even be more entrenched, and perhaps for that 
very reason even more forcefu11y repressed. This may explain in part 
why the prosecutors of the early 1970's "may have mounted much 
less convincing prosecutions of Loyalist than Nationalist defendants 
charged with similar offences."77 
To speculate even further, it might even be worth considering that 
what Smith ca11s the "anxiety of separation" and the "anxiety of en­
gulfment" do capture, to some degree, the co11ective psyche of the 
statelct. Republicans are traumatized by the fear of losing their iden­
tity by being separated from mother Ireland, and by being integrated 
with father Britain. As Gerry Adams, President of Provisional Sinn 
Fein, opines, 
Partition and the British connection distorts our politics, sets restrictions 
on our economic growth, and dictates our social outlook and our cultural 
values. 
Partition divides our people not just in the six countries but between the 
six countries and the twenty-six countries.78 
Unionists are the inverse. They are traumatized by the fear of losing 
their identity which is constructed to a large degree on their unity 
with Britain. They arc petrified of being engulfed by a Roman 
Catholic Ireland. During the hunger strike, for example, Ian Paisley's 
Protestant Telegraph posited 
The Church of Rome is to blame for the Hunger Strike saga. Rome has 
unleased the violence on our streets once again ... 
... Archbishop O'Fce (sic] and Bishop Daly have been agitating for politi­
cal status under the guise of Prison Reform. Their so-called persistent in­
tent in the so-called humanitarian aspects of the H-block issue has 
sparked off the present terror campaign that has once again slain many 
and wrought untold destruction. The Church of Rome is a cruel institu­
tion prepared to spill the blood of thousands in Ulster in order to achieve 
power.79 
77 S. Greer and A. White, "A Return to Trial by Jury", in Jennings, supra 
n.19, at 47, 64. 
78 G. Adams, A Pathway to Peace (Dublin: Mercier, 1 988), 10. 
79 Cited in P. O'Malley, supra n.69;at 173-174. See more generally, S. Bruce, 
God Save Ulster: The Religion and Politics of Paisley (Oxford: Clarendon, 
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The result of these identifications with such "macro-territorial icons" 
(as) a "United Ireland" or a "British Ulster" is a society pervaded by 
neurosis.80 
The ramifications of this sort of analysis for the Northern Ireland 
legal order are profoundly disturbing. The law, rather than being a 
cognate of reason, is a medium for the expression of "identity-in-op­
position. "81 It suggests that the Rule of Law instead of being the high­
est rational ideal, is in fact a repression of the unconscious reality and 
that all we have is the rule of men. And those men are driven by the 
trauma of fear. Perhaps this is why there is one "full-time member of 
the security forces for every sixty-nine people in Northern Ireland".82 
These conjectures should not be confined to the Irish situation. 
The fear of the other, the narcissism of sameness, the addictive desire 
to suppress those who are different may. be implicated within the 
very ideal of the Rule of Law. If this is true, it suggests that the vio­
lence of law is the pathological product of a neurotic social order. 
JV. Conclusion: Beyond the Fear and the Rule of Law 
To the extent that jurisprudence has addressed the question of 
fear, it is usually perceived as an clement of civil society and the state, 
and law in particular, is understood to rise above the clash of pas­
sions. The Rule of Law, however, is inherently constituted by the 
same processes and passions as civil society, and the pathological 
neurosis of fear is one. Moreover, the Ruic of Law is a particularly 
nefarious ideology in that because of its pretensions to neutrality and 
objectivity, it legitimises and rationalises its pathological -even tha­
natical -impulses. Witness Gibson L.J. 's eulogy (in the unreported 
case of R. v. Robinson) to the RUC death squad for their "courage and 
determination in bringing the three deceased men to justice; in this 
case, to the final court of justicc."83 
1986). 
80 Further support for these suggestions may be culled from K. Heskin, 
Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1980). 
81 O'Mallcy, supra n.69, at 259. 
82 Hillyard, supra n.21, at 192. 
83 Cited by A. Jennings in "Shoot to Kill: The Final Courts of Justice", supra 
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Yet, I do not think that all is doom and gloom, that by raising the 
spectre of the dark night of the unconscious, the nightmare that is 
Northern Ireland is irretrievably written off. Rather, I see important 
analogies between the therapeutic consequences of psychoanalytic ju­
risprudence and the critical enterprise. As Unger points out, the great 
thing about critique is that if you push it far enough, it will begin to 
identify the sources of the reconstructive agenda.84 Recent feminist 
scholarship,8.5 particularly in psychologica186 and moral87 theory has 
argued that the significance of the separation of self and others is very 
different for women than for men, and that the consequent anxieties 
of "engulfment and separation" are less traumatic.88 On this founda-
n.19, at 104. 116. Gibson, of course. was quite in tune with the perspec­
tive of much of the Protestant community. In a poll in May 1985 , not 
long after Gibson made his remarks, sixty-one percent of Protestants 
agreed that there ought to be a shoot to kill policy. See J. Whyte. 
Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 87. 
84 R. Unger, Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1 987). 3 volumes. 
8.5 R. Devlin, "Nomos and Thanatos: Part 8: Feminism as Jurisgenerative 
Transformation. or Resistance Through Partial Incorporation", Dallas Law 
f ournal 1 3  (1990), 1 23; " Towards an Anti-Racist Legal Education", 
University of New Brunswick Law f ournal 38 (1989). 89; "On the Road to 
Radical Reform: A Critical Review of Unger's Politics", Osgoode / lall Law 
fournal 28 (1990), 641; with A. Dobrowolsky, " The Big Mac Attack: 
Reflections on MacKinnon", McGill Law Journal 36(2) (1991 ). 575. 
86 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 1982); M. Bclenky. et al.. Women's Ways of Knowing (New York: 
Basic Books. 1986). 
87 J .  Tronto. "Beyond Gender Difference Toward a Theory of Care", Signs 12 
(1987), 644. 
88 In a very cautious and tentative aside I would also want to raise the ques­
tion of the role of women as a force of societal transformation (Thatcher 
notwithstanding). Most of the research and scholarship on Ireland has 
uncritically focused on the role of men and generalized from there. 
While clearly women have a multitude of perspectives on the crisis of 
Northern Ireland. let me suggest an interpretation of one aspect of the 
Hunger Strike that might merit further investigation and analysis. 
Whereas it was the basic position of both the British Government and the 
prisoners that the conflict was one of principle and that any compromise 
would be an indication of weakness, the mothers and sisters of some of 
those who were among the later batch of strikers were much more con­
textual in their approach. Although these women supported the five 
The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear 183 
tion, several femi nis ts have begun to cautiously articula te a post pa­
tria rchal vision of socia l re lations based upon what some have called 
an "ethic of ca re". The "e thic of care" strives to solve problems with­
ou t recourse to violence a nd aspires to "a more generative view of 
human life"89 and, I would add, law. 
Nor are feminis t ana lyses a lone in  their tenta tive suggestions for 
juridical recons truction. The cri tical theoris t, Walter Benjamin, for ex­
ample, thinks tha t  nonvio lent resolution of conflict is possib le. 
Without doubt ... nonviolent agreement is possible wherever a civilized 
outlook allows the use of unalloyed means of agreement. Legal and ille­
gal means of every kind that are all the same violent may be confronted 
with nonviolent ones as unalloyed means. Courtesy, sympathy, peace­
ableness. trust, and whatever else might here be mentioned. are their 
subjective preconditions.90 
And Roberto Mangabcira Unger has advocated the idea of "solidarity 
rights" tha t  recognize our vulnerabili ty and a ttemp t to "give legal 
form to social re lations of re liance and trus t. "91 
What ties each of these three perspectives toge ther are their tenta ­
tive sugges tions: tha t the antimony of self and others is ove rs ta ted ; 
tha t  i n  spite of ourselves and the cultura l  construc tions of our identi­
ties, we a re mutually interdependent and therefore mutua lly vulner­
able; and, tha t  grea ter  emphasis needs to be placed on  the potential of 
mu tual trust and responsibili ty. Each of these elements migh t have a 
juridical re levance to the concerns raised by this paper. Firs t, tha t  
while there is no doubt that  fear of the other is deeply implanted 
within the communi ties of Northern Ireland, in many ways there is 
much in  common; tha t the differences are re la tional ra ther  than fixed, 
demands and objected to the occupation of Ireland. they also valorized 
their relational "other", their sons. their brothers. In effect, it was they 
who brought the strike to an end, thereby preventing further deaths, and 
enabling the government to "grant" most of the demands, short of renew­
ing special category status. The prisoners on the other hand, among 
other things, did not have to succumb to the "badge of criminality" 
(uniforms). The achievement of these women, it might be suggested, was 
a mediation of the conflict. that managed to avoid the reduction of juridi­
cal relations to death. 
89 Gilligan, supra n.86. at 174. 
90 Supra n.43, at 289. 
91 R. Unger, False Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1987). 
535. 
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and therefore mutable.92 Second, it can be argued that those who are 
the primary legal actors have to recognize the legitimacy of "other­
ness", and develop mechanisms that facilitate the discursive articula­
tion of that otherness, so as to allow for the gradual growth of rela­
tions of trust. And third, if it is suggested that trust and mutuality are 
dependent upon the actors taking responsibility for the other, as well 
as responsibly for their own activities. 
In conclusion, I want briefly to suggest some of the juridical di­
mensions of responsibility that might be requested of the various con­
stituencies who have an influence on Northern Ireland, responsibili­
ties that might lay the foundation for the creation of a countervai1ing 
legal structure that is not overdetermined by violence. First, the Re­
publican community must acknowledge that its campaign of coun­
terviolence against the Northern Irish state, and the British govern­
ment, confirms Unionist fears of the genocidal aspirations of the na­
tionalist community. Rather, the Republican community should em­
phasize the fact that, after the secession of the twenty-six counties, the 
"other" Protestants in the Republic of Ireland have done quite well.93 
Second, the Catholic Church should dramatically curtail its own hege­
monic aspirations, for example, by acknowledging the legitimacy of 
mixed marriages and intercommunal education, thereby abandoning 
stances that reinforce the traditional Unionist siege mentality. Third, 
the Government of the Republic of Ireland should purge its constitu­
tion of the trappings of Catholic doctrine - particularly in relation to 
divorce, abortion and education - and pursue an agenda of seculari­
zation. 
On the Unionist side, what is required is a frank acceptance of 
historical responsibility for a sectarian state, and the acceptance of af­
firmative action programmes in education and employment to rem­
edy past wrongs. Moreover, it is possible that if the Catholic Church 
were to lose some of its power, populist Protestantism - for example 
in its Paisleyite form - would lose much (but clearly not all) of its 
support. But perhaps the most crucial fulcrum of responsibility for 
the horror that is Northern Ireland, lies with the British state, and 
what O' Ma11ey has described as "its chronic postcolonial hubris, its 
92 For a similar argument in the American context see M. Minow, Making 
Alf the Difference (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1 990). 
93 Sec, for example. K. Bowen. Protestants in a Catholic State: Ireland's 
Privileged Minority (Kingston: Queen ·s University Press. 1989). 
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predilection for an imperial righteousness that (sees) British action as 
being self-evidently justified."94 Not only must the British state and 
its repressive apparatuses recognize that their law is but an ideologi­
cally encoded formation of violence, they must recognize the legiti­
mate claims of the nationalist "other", eradicate their endocolonial 
practices, and take proactive steps, (for example by means of eco­
nomic sanctions95) to encourage recalcitrant unionists to accept Irish 
reunification. 
These tentative closing suggestions may appear abstract and 
naive. However, they have the advantage of highlighting the fact that 
"fear of the other" is constituted, entrenched and reinforced at every 
level of the matrix of social relations in Northern Ireland. Moreover, 
insofar as they emphasize responsibilities, they recognize that human 
agency is vital in spite of what would appear to be irresistible struc­
tural forces. The alternative is to acquiesce in the ideology of "a will 
to power" in which agency is reduced to death, and where the rela­
tion between state and citizen is that of mimetic violence. 
94 Supra n.69, at 8. 
95 B. Rowthorn and N. Wayne. Northern Ireland: The PolitiClll Economy of 
Conflict (Cambridge:  Polity. 1988). 
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